{"id":1190,"date":"2026-06-11T14:15:56","date_gmt":"2026-06-11T11:15:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/?p=1190"},"modified":"2026-06-11T14:15:57","modified_gmt":"2026-06-11T11:15:57","slug":"rusya-cin-yakinlasmasinin-gorunmeyen-celiskileri","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/?p=1190","title":{"rendered":"Rusya-\u00c7in Yak\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n G\u00f6r\u00fcnmeyen \u00c7eli\u015fkileri"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Mehmetcan \u015eahin<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Putin\u2019in son Pekin ziyareti, Rusya ile \u00c7in aras\u0131ndaki yak\u0131nla\u015fmay\u0131 yeniden g\u00fcndeme ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131. \u00d6zellikle Ukrayna sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nemde iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ekonomik ve siyasi ili\u015fkiler ciddi \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde derinle\u015fmi\u015f durumda. Bat\u0131\u2019da bu yak\u0131nla\u015fma \u00e7o\u011fu zaman ABD hegemonyas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 olu\u015fan yeni bir blok olarak yorumlan\u0131yor. Ancak Moskova ile Pekin aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fki, d\u0131\u015far\u0131dan g\u00f6r\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc kadar homojen ve sorunsuz de\u011fil. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ortakl\u0131k, ayn\u0131 zamanda ciddi g\u00fc\u00e7 asimetrileri ve uzun vadeli jeopolitik gerilimler de bar\u0131nd\u0131r\u0131yor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Asl\u0131nda Rusya ile \u00c7in aras\u0131ndaki yak\u0131nla\u015fman\u0131n temelleri Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin son d\u00f6nemine kadar uzan\u0131yor. Ancak ili\u015fkilerin bug\u00fcnk\u00fc seviyeye ula\u015fmas\u0131nda \u00f6zellikle 1990\u2019lar\u0131n sonlar\u0131nda ya\u015fanan geli\u015fmeler belirleyici olmu\u015ftur. NATO\u2019nun Kosova m\u00fcdahalesi hem Rusya\u2019ya hem de \u00c7in\u2019e ABD\u2019nin uluslararas\u0131 sistemde tek tarafl\u0131 askeri m\u00fcdahalelerde bulunabilece\u011fini g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir. Irak ve Libya m\u00fcdahaleleri de bu kayg\u0131lar\u0131 daha da artt\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ayn\u0131 d\u00f6nemde NATO\u2019nun eski Sovyet co\u011frafyas\u0131na do\u011fru geni\u015flemesi, Moskova\u2019da ciddi bir g\u00fcvenlik tehdidi alg\u0131s\u0131 yaratm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan s\u00fcre\u00e7 yaln\u0131zca jeopolitik kayg\u0131lardan olu\u015fmuyordu. 1990\u2019larda uygulanan neoliberal reformlar ve 1998 Ruble Krizi \u00fclkede b\u00fcy\u00fck bir ekonomik ve toplumsal y\u0131k\u0131m yaratt\u0131. \u00c7e\u00e7enistan\u2019daki sava\u015f ve Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n \u00c7e\u00e7enlere y\u00f6nelik yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 da Rus y\u00f6netiminde \u201c\u00e7evrelenme\u201d hissini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirdi. T\u00fcm bu geli\u015fmeler, Moskova ile Pekin aras\u0131nda ortak bir stratejik zeminin olu\u015fmas\u0131na katk\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u00d6zellikle 2000\u2019lerden itibaren iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ekonomik, siyasal ve askeri ili\u015fkiler h\u0131z kazand\u0131. \u015eangay \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc (\u015e\u0130\u00d6) ve BRICS gibi platformlar da bu yak\u0131nla\u015fmaya kurumsal bir \u00e7er\u00e7eve sundu. Ancak ili\u015fkilerin as\u0131l k\u0131r\u0131lma noktas\u0131 Ukrayna sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nemde ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bat\u0131 yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 nedeniyle Avrupa pazar\u0131ndan b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde d\u0131\u015flanan Rusya, ekonomik olarak \u00c7in\u2019e daha fazla y\u00f6nelmeye ba\u015flad\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Bu durum ticaret verilerine de yans\u0131yor. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ticaret hacmi 2021\u2019de yakla\u015f\u0131k 143 milyar dolar seviyesindeyken, 2024\u2019te 240 milyar dolar\u0131n \u00fczerine \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131 (OEC, 2026). \u00c7in bug\u00fcn Rusya\u2019n\u0131n en b\u00fcy\u00fck ticaret orta\u011f\u0131 konumunda. 2024 verilerine g\u00f6re \u00c7in, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n toplam ihracat\u0131n\u0131n yakla\u015f\u0131k %34\u2019\u00fcn\u00fc ve ithalat\u0131n\u0131n ise yakla\u015f\u0131k %56\u2019s\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturuyor (OEC, 2026a\/2026b). \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki finansal i\u015f birli\u011fi de derinle\u015fiyor. Moskova ve Pekin, dolar merkezli k\u00fcresel finans sistemine alternatif olarak ticarette yerel para birimlerinin kullan\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131r\u0131yor. 2025 itibar\u0131yla iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki i\u015flemlerin yakla\u015f\u0131k %99\u2019u Yuan ve Ruble \u00fczerinden ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftiriliyor (Insight EU Monitoring, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ancak bu yak\u0131nla\u015fman\u0131n \u00f6nemli \u00e7eli\u015fkileri de bulunuyor. Bunlar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda ili\u015fkinin giderek daha asimetrik bir yap\u0131ya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmesi geliyor. \u00c7in, Rusya i\u00e7in vazge\u00e7ilmez bir ekonomik ortak haline gelirken, Rusya, \u00c7in ekonomisi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan \u00e7ok daha s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 bir a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131\u011fa sahip. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00c7in\u2019den yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ithalat toplam ithalat\u0131n\u0131n yakla\u015f\u0131k %56\u2019s\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015ftururken, \u00c7in\u2019in Rusya\u2019dan yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ithalat toplam ithalat\u0131n\u0131n %1\u2019inden bile az bir seviyede kal\u0131yor (Insight EU Monitoring, 2026). Benzer bir e\u015fitsizlik ihracatta da g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor. \u00c7in, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n en b\u00fcy\u00fck ihracat pazar\u0131 haline gelirken, Rusya, \u00c7in\u2019in toplam ihracat\u0131nda olduk\u00e7a s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 bir yere sahip. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ticaretin yap\u0131s\u0131 da bu asimetriyi g\u00f6steriyor. Rusya a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 olarak enerji kaynaklar\u0131, hammaddeler ve tar\u0131m \u00fcr\u00fcnleri ihra\u00e7 ederken; \u00c7in, Rusya\u2019ya daha \u00e7ok sanayi ve teknoloji \u00fcr\u00fcnleri sat\u0131yor (Insight EU Monitoring, 2026). \u00dcstelik Rusya, Bat\u0131 yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 nedeniyle enerji \u00fcr\u00fcnlerini \u00c7in\u2019e \u00f6nemli indirimlerle satmak zorunda kal\u0131yor (MERICS, 2026). Bu durum Moskova-Pekin ili\u015fkisini e\u015fit ortakl\u0131ktan \u00e7ok asimetrik bir ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131k ili\u015fkisine yakla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131yor. Benzer bir tablo yat\u0131r\u0131m alan\u0131nda da g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor. Ukrayna sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u015firketlerin Rusya pazar\u0131ndan \u00e7ekilmesiyle olu\u015fan bo\u015flu\u011fu b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde \u00c7inli firmalar doldurmaya ba\u015flad\u0131 (Harici, 2026). Bu da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00c7in sermayesine ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131r\u0131yor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u0130li\u015fkinin bir di\u011fer k\u0131r\u0131lgan noktas\u0131 ise Orta Asya. Rusya ve \u00c7in bug\u00fcn b\u00f6lgede b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde i\u015f birli\u011fi i\u00e7erisinde hareket ediyor. Ancak \u00c7in\u2019in ekonomik y\u00fckseli\u015fi, uzun vadede Rusya\u2019n\u0131n geleneksel n\u00fcfuz alan\u0131n\u0131 a\u015f\u0131nd\u0131rabilecek bir dinamik de yarat\u0131yor. Sovyet d\u00f6neminden kalan enerji hatlar\u0131 sayesinde Rusya uzun y\u0131llar boyunca Orta Asya enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n Avrupa\u2019ya ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131nda merkezi bir rol oynad\u0131. Bu durum Moskova\u2019ya b\u00f6lge \u00fczerinde ciddi bir ekonomik ve siyasi bask\u0131 kapasitesi sa\u011fl\u0131yordu. Ancak \u00c7in\u2019in d\u00fcnyan\u0131n en b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00fcretim merkezlerinden biri haline gelmesi, Pekin\u2019i devasa bir enerji ithalat\u00e7\u0131s\u0131na d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrd\u00fc. Orta Asya \u00fclkeleri enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 \u00c7in\u2019e ula\u015ft\u0131rmak i\u00e7in Rusya\u2019ya ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 de\u011fillerdir. Bu durum, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgesel ekonomik etkisini s\u0131n\u0131rland\u0131r\u0131yor. \u00dcstelik \u00c7inli \u015firketler Orta Asya\u2019daki altyap\u0131 projeleri, ihaleler ve yat\u0131r\u0131mlarda giderek daha bask\u0131n hale geliyor. Rus \u015firketleri ise \u00c7in\u2019in ekonomik kapasitesiyle rekabet etmekte zorlan\u0131yor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla bug\u00fcn Moskova ile Pekin\u2019i birbirine yakla\u015ft\u0131ran temel unsur ortak ideolojik pozisyonlardan \u00e7ok ortak jeopolitik bask\u0131lard\u0131r. \u00d6zellikle ABD\u2019nin k\u00fcresel siyasetteki bask\u0131s\u0131 iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkilerin geli\u015fimini h\u0131zland\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak bu durum, Rusya ile \u00c7in aras\u0131nda uzun vadeli ve sorunsuz bir ittifak olu\u015ftu\u011fu anlam\u0131na gelmemektedir. Ekonomik asimetri, Orta Asya\u2019daki rekabet dinamikleri ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n giderek artan \u00c7in ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131, bu ili\u015fkinin gelecekte daha k\u0131r\u0131lgan hale gelmesine yol a\u00e7abilir. Nitekim bug\u00fcn bile taraflar, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00c7in\u2019e enerji ihracat\u0131n\u0131 ciddi \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde art\u0131rabilecek Sibirya\u2019n\u0131n G\u00fcc\u00fc-2 projesi gibi iki taraf\u0131nda \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131na uyabilecek bir konuda tam anlam\u0131yla uzla\u015fabilmi\u015f de\u011fillerdir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Kaynak\u00e7a<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cChina\u2013Russia trade boom cools as Beijing raises the price of partnership,\u201d <em>Insight EU Monitoring<\/em>, 19 May\u0131s 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), \u201c\u00c7in-Rusya \u0130kili Ticaret Profili\u201d, eri\u015fim tarihi: 22 May\u0131s 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/oec.world\/en\/profile\/bilateral-country\/chn\/partner\/rus\">https:\/\/oec.world\/en\/profile\/bilateral-country\/chn\/partner\/rus<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), \u201cRusya \u00dclke Profili \u2013 \u0130thalat Verileri\u201d, eri\u015fim tarihi: 22 May\u0131s 2026a, <a href=\"https:\/\/oec.world\/en\/profile\/country\/rus\">https:\/\/oec.world\/en\/profile\/country\/rus<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), \u201c\u00c7in \u00dclke Profili\u201d, eri\u015fim tarihi: 22 May\u0131s 2026b, <a href=\"https:\/\/oec.world\/en\/profile\/country\/chn\">https:\/\/oec.world\/en\/profile\/country\/chn<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Harici, \u201cRusya ve \u00c7in Aras\u0131ndaki Ticaret Hacmi 240 Milyar Dolara Ula\u015ft\u0131\u201d, eri\u015fim tarihi: 22 May\u0131s 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/harici.com.tr\/rusya-ve-cin-arasindaki-ticaret-hacmi-240-milyar-dolara-ulasti\/\">https:\/\/harici.com.tr\/rusya-ve-cin-arasindaki-ticaret-hacmi-240-milyar-dolara-ulasti\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>MERICS, \u201cChina-Russia Dashboard: Facts and Figures on a Special Relationship\u201d, eri\u015fim tarihi: 22 May\u0131s 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/merics.org\/en\/china-russia-dashboard-facts-and-figures-special-relationship?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/merics.org\/en\/china-russia-dashboard-facts-and-figures-special-relationship<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Mehmetcan \u015eahin Putin\u2019in son Pekin ziyareti, Rusya ile \u00c7in aras\u0131ndaki yak\u0131nla\u015fmay\u0131 yeniden g\u00fcndeme ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131. \u00d6zellikle Ukrayna sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nemde iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ekonomik ve siyasi ili\u015fkiler ciddi \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde derinle\u015fmi\u015f durumda. Bat\u0131\u2019da bu yak\u0131nla\u015fma \u00e7o\u011fu zaman ABD hegemonyas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 olu\u015fan yeni bir blok olarak yorumlan\u0131yor. Ancak Moskova ile Pekin aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fki, d\u0131\u015far\u0131dan g\u00f6r\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc kadar homojen ve [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":1191,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4,5,7,28],"tags":[],"series":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1190"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1190"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1190\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1192,"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1190\/revisions\/1192"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/1191"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1190"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1190"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1190"},{"taxonomy":"series","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.atilim.edu.tr\/manzara-politik\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fseries&post=1190"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}